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Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a quickly advancing technology that has the potential to
displace a great deal of workers. Unlike past automation-based technologies, I find that high
skilled labor is more impacted by AI than lower skilled labor. In order to analyze the impact that
AI will have on the labor market, I utilize a fixed effects model for a historical case of
automation’s impact on employment and a fitted parameter methodology to analyze the careers
most and least exposed to artificial intelligence. My results suggest that an increase in exposure
to automation technologies by one percentile leads to a .049% decrease in industry-occupation
share of the labor market.
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Introduction and Motivation
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Throughout modern economic history, automation technologies have almost strictly been
substitutes for low skilled labor and complements to high skilled labor; however, as human
innovation and technological advancements have progressed, there now exists a technology that
has the potential to displace high skilled labor. Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to technologies
that utilize machine learning, in which computers analyze data using algorithms, establish
statistical patterns, and use these patterns to make decisions. Differing from past technology, AI
completes tasks with no human instruction (outside of the development of AI itself), and atop
this fact, AI achieves these tasks with superhuman performance (Webb, 2020). As such,
artificial intelligence is causing a great deal of anxiety over the future of human work and
employment. The aim of this paper is to analyze the potential impact that artificial intelligence
will have on employment (by industry and occupation).
The impact of automation on the labor market has been a concern for economists since
the organization of modern work arose. The motivation for a plethora of economic papers on
automation, including this one, comes from John Maynard Keynes’s idea of technological
unemployment, which is “unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use
of labour outrunning the pace at which we can find new uses for labour” (Keynes, 1930). When
technological advancements significantly outpace new job creation, there is a significant
disconnect between the amount of available jobs and the amount of individuals in the labor force.
Changes in the labor market are slow to occur for a multitude of reasons: investing in human
capital takes a great deal of time and effort, new industries are slow to develop, occupations
remaining may not be suitable for certain demographics, etc. However, historically these
changes do occur over time, and standards of living are improved for virtually everyone in the
economy. This evolution in the labor market was understood and predictable. Artificial
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intelligence has the potential to change technological expectations; therefore, the implications of
AI on employment and demographic equality and inequality ought to be analyzed.
Currently, there exists a “false dichotomy” in the debate on artificial intelligence and its
implications on the labor market: AI means the end of human work versus AI, regardless of its
capabilities, will contribute to an increase in labor demand like automation technologies have
always done in the past (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Those who are more pessimistic have
an understandable viewpoint. Artificial intelligence is capable and will advance to be more
capable of doing something that was previously exclusive to the human aspect of the labor
market: the ability to learn, adapt, and make decisions. Atop this, because artificial intelligence
tends to target high skilled labor that requires more of an investment in human capital (Webb,
2020), the previous “cure” of investing in more human capital will not be nearly as effective as it
was in the past. However, the past normally and somewhat accurately, tends to provide insight
into what the future holds. This paper will analyze historical technological forms of automation
(robots and software) on employment and use these parameters to estimate the potential impact
of artificial intelligence and machine learning on employment.

II.

Literature Review
Artificial intelligence is cutting edge technology and its potential impact on the future of

human work is just being realized. As such, the economic literature on artificial intelligence is in
the early phases and relatively scarce. However, the study of general automation of work and its

Lavy 6
impact on labor is extensive. Publications of this sort will assist in guiding the historical analysis
necessary to examine artificial intelligence, and any paper that analyzes artificial intelligence
first examines historical cases. The most common first step among existing literature is defining
and providing a numerical score for some sort of a “technology” variable. This entails matching
common tasks found in various occupations to tasks that patented technologies are capable of
performing. Patented technology is defined as any and all products, processes, and methods
registered with the US Patent Office. Multiple sources (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock, 2018;
Frey and Osborne, 2013; Webb, 2020) utilize data from O*NET, which is a database provided by
the US Department of Labor that explains the tasks performed in occupations in the United
States. If a patented technology has the capability to perform a task within an occupation, then
its technology score increases. However, though the goal is the same, there are different
methodologies in establishing these scores. Frey and Osborne utilize a Gaussian process
classifier in order to establish a “probability of computerisation” for 702 detailed occupations.
Brynjolfsson, Mitchell, and Rock construct a variable entitled the “suitability for machine
learning” or SML, which takes 964 occupations in the economy and matches them to 18,156
specific tasks at the occupation level. The authors then use a rubric developed in a past paper
written by Brynjolfsson to determine the SML. Because all occupations have a multitude of
different tasks, virtually no occupation has tasks that are all ‘SML’. Similarly, Webb (2020)
develops a technological exposure score for occupations collected through the American
Community Survey. Task descriptions from O*NET are cross referenced with public patent
data, which is gathered through Google Patents. Verb-noun pairs from each dataset are matched
with the use of WordNet, a program commonly used in natural language processing for
literature. Based on the frequency of verb-noun pairs, Webb establishes a numerical exposure
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score and exposure percentile for each occupation. Upon the creation of this variable, all of
these authors are able to analyze and run models on technology’s (and more particularly artificial
intelligence) impact on the labor market. Various other papers, including Bessen, et. al, 2019
and Graetz and Michaels, 2018, examine technology’s impact differently. In Automatic Reaction
– What Happens to Workers at Firms that Automate?, the authors examine firm level data after
the introduction of automation technology, while in Robots at Work, the authors utilize data
from the International Federation of Robotics. Despite having different focuses, these papers
share a similar theme: to examine the impact of modern automation on the labor market.
Like with any economic analysis of future trends, there are limitations. Predicting and
even explaining the impact of technology is no easy feat. Virtually any author of empirical
papers on automation based technologies discuss the limitations of their research in their
conclusion section. However, compelling results that are logically sound are possible and given
in the existing literature. There are variations in the results ranging from a conclusion that areas
in which automation is a factor, incumbent workers are more likely to be displaced (Bessen, et.
al, 2019) to an increase in the use of industrial robots and other forms of technology contribute to
a significant increase in labor productivity (Graetz and Michaels, 2018). Papers that look
exclusively at AI or machine learning find that these forms of automation have the potential to
displace highly educated, high skilled labor, which is a historical first (Brynjolfsson, Mitchell,
and Rock, 2018; Webb, 2020). Frey and Osborne have more pessimistic results, which suggest
that 47% of total employment in the United States is considered at “high risk,” meaning that
these jobs could potentially be fully automated within the next two decades. Regardless, all of
these results suggest that the current technological boom should be studied and understood.
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In The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the Labor Market, Michael Webb examines the
impact of AI further by running a simulation to predict the future of income inequality. He finds
that AI has the potential to decrease income inequality by displacing high skilled workers who
tend to be paid more. His paper also examines various descriptive statistics of demographics,
including age, gender, education, and wage percentile. However, the authors of the existing
literature do not predict the displacement effect on employment as Webb did for two historical
cases. As such, this paper will explore the potential changes in employment for artificial
intelligence explicitly.

III.

Theoretical Model
The theoretical model for this paper is guided by the historical tendency for capital or

technology to substitute for labor when it performs the same or comparable tasks better than its
human counterpart. In the past, automation in all its forms, whether advanced farming
equipment of the Industrial Revolution or robots that have taken over the manufacturing
industry, initially reduced the demand for labor and put downward pressure on wages. Labor
and wage reduction is counteracted by a productivity effect, which leads to cost savings, which
leads to an increase in the labor demand for occupations not impacted by AI (Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2018). However, artificial intelligence can have an ambiguous effect on labor because
there may or may not be a mismatch of skills between remaining occupations and displaced high
skilled workers. Another potential problem arises with the rate at which artificial intelligence is
being introduced and developed. This exorbitant rate can further the divide between displacing
workers and the counter effect discussed above. The employment and wage reduction
(displacement effect) does not necessarily fade in a timely fashion: the negative impact from the
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introduction of robots and software are still measurable and significant after 10 years (Webb,
2020). As such, the detrimental aspects of artificial intelligence will more than likely be
observable well into the future; therefore, examining and predicting the severity of the impact on
employment is necessary.
In the publication Artificial Intelligence: The Ambiguous Labor Market Impact of
Automating Prediction, Argawal, et al. (2019) layout theoretical models and scrutinize all
necessary economic intuition for analyzing artificial intelligence and the labor market. Artificial
intelligence causes displacement anxiety for good reason: computers have advanced at an
alarming rate over the past decade and their use for economically valuable tasks is developing
just as quickly. Currently, AI is more than sufficient in making predictions, which are a major
component of decision making. AI performed predictions tasks are perfect substitutes to human
performed prediction tasks and are perfect complements to decision tasks. AI will directly
disrupt prediction task based jobs and may indirectly impact decision task based jobs by
changing the relative returns of labor versus capital (Argaway, et al., 2019). The authors
continue to suggest that occupations that were not previously thought of as prediction based will
be transformed and reconfigured in order to minimize costs for firms. Regardless of the
occupation, the authors suggest thinking of occupations in terms of prediction and decision tasks,
due to the substitutionary and complementary relationship. Similarly to all historical cases of
automation displacing workers, artificial intelligence will likely “lead to increases in labor tasks
upstream or downstream” (Argaway, et al., 2019). Chin et al. (2005) found this to be the case
during the Second Industrial Revolution, as the automation in the sailing and shipping industry
initially decreased demand for sailors. This was counteracted by the creation of a new demand
for engineers aboard ships and an increase in productivity for merchants. Because of the cyclical
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nature of the economy and the similarities between past technology and artificial intelligence,
history will provide insight on the future. This leads to the hypothesis for this paper that higher
exposure to technology (and artificial intelligence specifically) will lead to a decrease in
industry-occupational employment. In other words, after substitutionary technology is
introduced in an industry-occupation the relative number of individuals within that industryoccupation will decrease, as shown through a decrease in the industry-occupation’s share of the
labor market.

IV.

Data and Empirical Methodology
My primary source of data comes from the American Community Survey. I use

individuals’ race, gender, level of education, age, and income as control variables. I restrict
these controls to 2010. These (excluding age and income, which are quantitative) are first
constructed as dummy variables. Race is divided by white, African American, and other; levels
of education is measured by Low Education (less than high school) Medium Education (diploma
or GED, some college) and High Education (Bachelor’s degree or Higher). I then utilize the
means procedure to find the demographic makeup of each industry-occupation cell. My
occupation and industry variables are standardized using titles and descriptions from 1990.
Using David Dorn’s offshorability by occ1990 variable, I control for global occupational
relocation.
In order to create my employment variable, I follow the literature and first establish an
industry-occupation variable, in which the first three digits are the industry (1990 basis) code and
the last three digits are the occupation (1990 basis) code. Rather than strictly looking at
occupations, the industry-occupation provides a deeper level of insight into occupations that span
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across multiple industries (and allow for many more observations). I then utilized the DHS
method which was created by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh in 1996. This effectively creates
an “arc percentage” or percent change related to the midpoint and calculates the change in share
of employment. I do this by finding each industry-occupation’s change in share of the labor
market from 1980 to 2010 and dividing by an average of the two years. The DHS percent
change between 1980 and 2010 (which I multiply by 100 so that all parameter estimates make
more sense) is my dependent variable.
The proxy variable for technology comes from Michael Webb (2020). Each occupation
with a 1990 basis from the ACS data is given an exposure score to various types of technology
including software and artificial intelligence. Webb assigns this score by analyzing the text of
task descriptions found in patents (pulled from Google Patents) and matching that to that of task
description for each occupation (pulled from O*NET). By matching verb-noun pairs found in
both patents and job descriptions, Webb is able to quantify the extent to which each job may be
automated. It is important to note that the exposure score to AI does not describe the extent to
which occupations have already been automated, but how these tasks have the potential to be
automated, while the exposure score to software gives a better insight into how careers have
already been automated. Furthermore, this exposure score is then measured as a percentile in
order to make comparisons between occupations more simple. In order to assign an exposure
score percentile to each individual in the American Community Survey data, I merge the datasets
by the occupation code present in both datasets. I utilize the exposure score to software as my
main independent variable in empirical methods and the exposure score to artificial intelligence
for the fitted parameter analysis of the industry-occupations most and least exposed to artificial
intelligence. Michael Webb also utilized the fitted parameter methodology. The Digital
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Revolution of the 1990s contributed to similar societal anxieties over employment as the AI
revolution of today is doing, making software a valid benchmark in analyzing AI.
In order to gain initial results, I use a simple ordinary least squares regression, and later
run the same model controlled for occupational fixed effect. In the following model, i represents
the occupation:
DHSPctChangeᵢ = 𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁ pct_softwareᵢ + 𝛽₂ task_offshorabilityᵢ + 𝛽₃ Femaleᵢ +

𝛽₄ African_Americanᵢ + 𝛽₅ Other_Raceᵢ + 𝛽₆ Ageᵢ + 𝛽₇ Medium_Educationᵢ +
𝛽₈ High_Educationᵢ + 𝛽₉ LogIncomeᵢ + εᵢ
The independent variable of interest is pct_software, which ranks each industryoccupation’s exposure to software based technologies on a percentile level. Using the reasoning
that technology is a substitute for labor, I expect that this coefficient will be negative. I expect a
similar phenomena to occur for the task_offshorabilty variable, as occupations that are more
likely to be sent to other countries will lose share of the domestic labor market.
My expectations for the demographic control variables are mainly rooted in trends and
generalizations. The female coefficient will likely be positive because of an increase in females
in the labor market. African American labor force participants tend to be in lower skilled
occupations, and as such I predict that the African_American variable will have a negative
coefficient. The Other_Race variable may be a little more ambiguous, as individuals of other
races are more heterogeneous with both high and low skilled individuals. As such, I expect the
other race variable to be slightly positive, albeit closer to zero. The Age variable will likely be
negative due to older people being more exposed to technology than younger people. Human
capital attainment has a positive relationship with employment, so I expect Medium and High
levels of education to have a positive coefficient. I expect LogIncome, which is a log measure of
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individuals’ yearly earnings, to be positive because of a trend of the labor market moving
towards higher wages.

V.

Descriptive Results
Descriptive statistics are crucial for understanding who will be most impacted by the

artificial intelligence movement and increasing levels of automation. To measure this, I
correlated occupational demographics to Exposure to AI. Because I restricted the level of
education down to three broad categories, I rather looked at the IPUMS detailed education level
for more observations in this correlation. A higher x-value corresponds to a higher level of
education. For the age correlation, I found the average level of exposure for each age, such that
there is one observation for each year old (18-65) age group. My results fell in line with existing
literature:
Figure 1: Average exposure by level of education (left) & Average exposure by age (right)

Unlike past trends, one gains more exposure to this form of automation technology as they invest
more into human capital. In other words, higher educated people are more likely to work with (or
be substituted) by artificial intelligence. The correlation coefficient of .86 suggests a strong
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relationship between education and AI exposure. Generally speaking, older people are more
likely to be exposed to AI than those first entering the labor market. This relationship has a great
deal of importance: older workers are more “immobile,” both geographically and occupationally,
and because they have fewer years left in the labor market, retraining is less appealing to them
(Webb, 2020). The relationship between gender and exposure to AI was not as clear (or as
visually appealing) as the other two demographics. Females are less likely to be exposed to AI,
with a relatively weak correlation coefficient of -.26. An exhaustive list of more descriptive
statistics can be found in Tables 1 & 2 of the Appendix.

VI.

Empirical Results

i. Historical Analysis (Software)
In order to examine whether or not technological exposure has a negative relationship
with employment, I utilized both an Ordinary Least Squares and a one-way fixed effects model.
Within the OLS model (See model 2 in Table 3), my independent variable of interest
(pct_software) is negative and significant, just as I hypothesized. The results suggest that an
increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile in technological exposure results in a 5.5% decrease
in industry-occupation share in the labor market, all other things being equal. Though this
percentage may seem small, the labor market was over 150 million people in 2010, making every
hundredth of a percent have a profound impact. Although this is the historical technological
impact on employment, with the fitted parameter methodology, this has a great deal of impact for
the future of the labor market as the artificial intelligence movement continues. The task
offshorability parameter estimate is negative, as expected. If tasks in a particular occupation
have a high tendency to be relocated to other countries, then these occupations would be
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expected to have a lesser share of the labor market domestically. As for the control /
demographic results, education parameters became increasingly more positive at each level.
From 1980 to 2010, careers became more and more dependent on higher levels of human capital
attainment which suggests that those who achieved a high school diploma or higher would see
their occupation’s share of the labor market increase. Similarly, the female coefficient is positive
such that an increase of 1 % in the female ratio of each industry-occupation results in a .19 %
increase in an industry-occupation’s share of the labor market. This is likely due to the female
labor force participation rate increasing from 1980 to 2010 as well as a high female participation
rate in service based industries, which are not as impacted by technology. The coefficient for
age is negative as expected, with an increase in average age by 1 year leading to a .97 %
decrease in industry-occupation’s share of the labor market. This is likely due to the aging labor
market: the Baby Boomer generation (which is larger than other generations) reached retirement
age by 2010, and as such industry-occupation’s with an older average age shrank. In terms of
race, industry-occupations with a higher percentage of African American individuals saw their
share of the labor market actually increase, which was opposite of what was expected. For every
additional percentage of African American individuals, the industry-occupation’s share of the
labor market increases by .095%, and for every additional percentage of other races, the
industry-occupation’s share of the labor market increases by .1319%.
With 19,836 industry-occupations as observations, all variables except for African
American were statistically significant beyond the 99 percent level. The model has a weak
adjusted r-squared value of .0559 which suggests this model can only explain about 5% of the
variation. However, this likely stems from the fact that this is a simple OLS without controlling
for endogeneity or any other problems.
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The F-Value of 23.11 (Model 4 in Table 3) suggests that I can reject the null hypothesis
of no fixed effects, thus indicating that a fixed effects model is more suited for my research
question than an OLS. After controlling for occupation fixed effects, the coefficient for
technological exposure remains robust; however, it weakens slightly, such that an increase from
the 25th to the 75th percentile in technological exposure results in a 2.45% decrease in industryoccupation share in the labor market. This coefficient also became slightly less statistically
significant, dropping from the 99% level to 95% level. Most other coefficients remain similar to
those in the OLS. The biggest difference comes from the log of yearly income variable, as it was
negative and significant in the OLS model but positive and significant in the fixed effects, such
that a one percent increase in yearly income leads to a .0466% increase in labor market share by
industry-occupation.
The explanatory power of the fixed effects model is much greater than that of the OLS
model, with an adjusted r-squared value of .2413. This is comparable to the adjusted r-squared
that Michael Webb (2020) found with his fixed effects model. When the fixed effects
methodology is implemented, the chance of omitted variable bias is greatly reduced and validity
is added to the results.
ii. Prediction Analysis (AI)
Following the literature, I use fitted parameters in order to predict the future of artificial
intelligence's impact on employment. This Digital Revolution is often considered the Third
Industrial Revolution and shares a great deal of similarities with the technological advancements
of today, which is often referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Within the later part of
the twentieth century, technology became a staple of everyday life. The rise of the internet and
personal computers, average individuals were able to utilize relatively advanced technology in
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their homes. However, in the workplace, digitization and software caused a great deal of socioeconomic anxieties over the future of work (and as my results suggest, these anxieties were valid
since software exposure did decrease share of employment). Political leaders and innovators of
AI are voicing some of the same concerns today. Since the Digital Revolution of the late
twentieth century can be used as a benchmark, I can utilize the parameters found in model 4, but
substitute my exposure percentile for software with the exposure score for artificial intelligence.
This requires me to make the strong assumption that software will have the same impact as AI,
just on different occupations. Utilizing the fitted parameters I found the predicted impact for the
five industry-occupations most and least exposed to Artificial Intelligence:
Figure 2: Examining the most and least exposed industry-occupations. Most exposed have an
exposure percentile of 100 and least exposed have an exposure percentile of 1.

Prediction for Artificial Intelligence
Fitted Parameters

Most Exposed to AI
Occupation

Least Exposed to AI

(Industry)

Predicted
DHS Δ

Clinical Laboratory Technicians

8.97

(Health Services)

Chemical Engineers

18.82
-3.84

Dispatchers

Funeral Directors

-.781

Food Preparation

-5.06

Mail Carriers

-3.38

(US Postal Service)

-4.26

(Electric Light and Power)
(Public Order)

Predicted
DHS Δ

(Restaurant)

(Optometry)

Power Plant Operators

(Industry)

(Funerals & Crematories)

(Industrial Chemicals)

Optometrists

Occupation

Subject Instructors

34.16

(Colleges & Universities)

-1.05

Art/Entertainment Performers
(Misc. Personal Services)

Notes: Predicted change in DHS is calculated using industry-occupation specific demographics and the
parameters found in the detailed Fixed Effect Model (1).

-5.07
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The most exposed industry-occupations are all within the 100th percentile for exposure to
artificial intelligence whilst the least exposed industry-occupations are within the 1st percentile.
Because the historical analysis examined a change over 30 years, the numbers above estimate the
change from 2010 to 2040. There are some pretty clear trends, with the highly exposed careers
mainly losing labor market share. However, there are quite a few discrepancies, which come as
a result of technological exposure not having the only role in determining changes in
employment. Most notably, chemical engineers and clinical technicians are highly exposed to
AI, but the fields are expected to grow quite significantly. An overwhelming majority of
individuals in these occupations have medium or high levels of education. Similarly, industryoccupations that are minimally exposed and have lower average levels of education, such as art
performers and food workers, actually decrease in their share of the labor market. This suggests
that gains from higher levels of human capital investment can outweigh the losses that come
from being exposed to automation (and vice versa). In a broader sense, the highest amounts of
investment in education may offer job security against automation. There exists a plethora of
other variables that play a role in determining the shape of the labor market, many of which are
impossible to capture manually. However, when controlling for fixed effects between
occupations, exposure to technology is most definitely influential in how industry-occupations
change over time.

VII.

Conclusions and Limitations
Higher technological exposure was shown to historically decrease occupational labor

market share / employment, which confirms my hypothesis. I make rather strong assumptions by
utilizing the fitted parameter methodology, and truthfully, I do not believe AI and software will
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have the same exact economic impact. Though my research finds that the impact of an artificial
intelligence revolution may not be as extreme as others suggest, there are a great deal of policy
and societal implications. Firstly, individuals (especially those entering college and the labor
force) should be aware of the potential their field has for being automated. This will
undoubtedly impact the types of degrees college students obtain as AI becomes more and more
prevalent in the workforce. Secondly, state and national governments should be aware of the
potential for structural unemployment and the welfare safety nets for these individuals.
Industry leaders and government leaders alike have warned about the future of artificial
intelligence. Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX and Tesla, often warns about what the future of AI
has in store. Because of his familiarity with the powerful technology, he has stated that he
believes AI is a “fundamental threat to the existence of human civilization,” and as such
regulation from the government should be “proactive rather than reactive.” Similarly, Russian
President Vladimir Putin says that the nation that leads in AI “will be the ruler of the world.”
These public statements contribute to societal anxieties, but also suggest that AI holds more
potential (economically) than any past technologies.
Because artificial intelligence is continuously advancing and has only recently started
being used to perform humanlike tasks, the general public may not see the direct impacts for
upwards of 5 or so years. Measuring phenomena that have not yet occured is difficult because
data simply does not exist, which is why I utilized past data to provide an insight into the future.
However, as the above literature suggests, artificial intelligence may not necessarily lead to some
of the same economic consequences as software. The reality that stems from artificial
intelligence may be much more ambiguous than my model suggests. A displacement effect may
occur much faster than in previous cases as software requires constant human instruction, while
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artificial intelligence does not. However, artificial intelligence also requires a great deal of
investing in complementary capital (Webb, 2020), which may slow down a possible
displacement effect. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the future of artificial intelligence,
future econometric analysis is needed as the data applicable to AI becomes available.
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IX.

Appendix
Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics
n=19,836
Variable

Description

Mean

Source

task_offshorability

Score for outsourcing by OCC1990

.431

David Dorn

pct_ai

Exposure percentile to AI by OCC1990

54.402

Michael Webb

pct_software

Exposure percentile to software by OCC1990

52.75

Michael Webb

Female

Average percentage of women across industryoccupations (2010 basis)

.399

ACS

White

Average percentage of white individuals across
industry-occupations (2010 basis)

.802

ACS

African_American

Average percentage of African American
individuals across industry-occupations (2010
basis)

.09

ACS

Other_Race

Average percentage of individuals of a different
race across industry-occupations (2010 basis)

.108

ACS

Low_Education

Average percentage of individuals with a low
level of education across industry-occupations
(2010 basis)

.087

ACS

Medium_Education

Average percentage of individuals with a
medium level of education across industryoccupations (2010 basis)

.63

ACS

High_Education

Average percentage of individuals with a high
level of education across industry-occupations

.283

ACS

DHS

Average arc percentage change in share of the
labor market across industry-occupations times
100

.705

ACS

LogIncome

Average log of annual income ($) across
industry-occupations in 2010

9.18

ACS
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Table 2.

Pearson Correlation Coefficients
N = 19,836
Variable

DHS

pct_software

pct_ai

task_offshorability

1

-.079
<.0001

.054
<.0001

-.046
<.0001

pct_software

-.079
<.0001

1

.603
<.0001

-.171
<.0001

pct_ai

.054
<.0001

.603
<.0001

1

-.144
<.0001

task_offshorability

-.046
<.0001

-.171
<.0001

-.144
<.0001

1

Female

.084
<.0001

-.336
<.0001

-.272
<.0001

.335
<.0001

.007
.343

.006
.409

-.059
<.0001

.002
.736

Other_Race

.029
<.0001

.018
.011

-.008
.286

.038
<.0001

Age

-.092
<.0001

-.005
.445

.057
<.0001

-.051
<.0001

Medium_Education

-.138
<.0001

.117
<.0001

-.164
<.0001

-.103
<.0001

High_Education

.173
<.0001

-.193
<.0001

.190
<.0001

.133
<.0001

DHS

African_American

Table 3.
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Technology & Employment
Dependent Variable: DHSPctChange x 100

Model
Variable

OLS (1)

OLS (2)

OLS (3)

Fixed Effects (4)

Fixed Effects (5)

Intercept

14.82***
(1.48)

57.36***
(7.38)

64.89***
(6.58)

-14.89
(9.54)

-16.78*
(9.05)

Exposure to
software

-.264***
(.02)

-.11***
(.03)

-.17***
(.02)

-.049**
(.02)

-.06***
(.02)

Task Offshorability

-8.98***
(.59)

-7.44***
(.57)

-5.36***
(.55)

-4.79***
(.53)

Medium Education

15.73***
(3.86)

16.94***
(3.84)

8.65***
(3.63)

8.41**
(3.60)

High Education

70.55***
(4.24)

77.82***
(4.19)

43.39***
(3.98)

45.99***
(3.92)

Income (Log)

-7.08***
(.00)

-13.42***
(.99)

4.66***
(1.05)

1.50
(.98)

Female

18.98***
(2.16)

6.41***
(2.03)

African American

9.50**
(3.96)

3.86
(3.79)

Other Race

13.19***
(3.69)

10.73***
(3.39)

Age

-.97***
(.09)

-.64***
(.09)

Adj. R-Squared

.0057

.0559

.0465

.2413

.2384

F-Value

115.19

131.47

194.33

23.11

23.86

# of Observations

19,836

19,836

19,836

19,836

19,836

Notes: Each observation is an industry-occupation cell. The dependent variable is 100x the DHS change for each
industry-occupation from 1980 to 2010. Standard errors are shown parenthetically below each estimator. Statistical
significance is demonstrated as * (90%), ** (95%), and *** (99%). Fixed Effects Models are one way fixed by
occupation, and the F-value refers to the F Test for no Fixed Effects.
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X.

Relevant SAS Code

data IPUMS.dum;
set IPUMS.usa_00016;
if sex = 2 then Female = 1;
else Female =0;
if raced = 100 then White = 1;
else White= 0;
if raced = 200 then African_American= 1;
else African_American = 0;
if 110 le raced le 150 then delete;
if 210 le raced le 996 then Other_Race=1;
else Other_Race = 0;
if 000 le EducD le 061 then Less_than_HS =
else Less_than_HS = 0;
if 062 le EducD le 064 then Diploma_or_GED
else Diploma_or_GED = 0;
if 065 le EducD le 100 then Some_College =
else Some_College = 0;
if EducD = 101 then Bachelors = 1;
else Bachelors = 0;
if 110 le EducD le 116 then Masters_Plus =
else Masters_Plus = 0;
if educd = 999 then delete;

1;
= 1;
1;

1;

if 000 le EducD le 061 then Low_Education =1;
else Low_Education = 0;
if 062 le EducD le 100 then Medium_Education = 1;
else Medium_Education = 0;
if 101 le EducD le 116 then High_Education = 1;
else High_Education= 0;
if empstat
else
if empstat
else
if empstat

= 1 then Employed = 1;
Employed = 0;
= 2 then Unemployed = 1;
Unemployed = 0;
= 3 then delete;

if
if
if
if

=
=
=
=

occ1990
ind1990
incwage
incwage

.
.
.
0

then
then
then
then

delete;
delete;
delete;
delete;

industry= IND1990 *1000;
indocc = industry + occ1990;
Income = incwage / 52;
LogIncome = log(Income);
run;
proc sort;
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by occ1990;
run;
libname Exp "D:\Senior_Project\Exp";
filename ai "D:\Senior_Project\Exp\Exposure.csv";
proc sort data = exp.ai;
by occ1990;
run;
proc import Datafile = "D:\Senior_Project\Offshore\Offshore.dta" out =
offshoring REPLACE;
run;
proc sort data = work.offshoring;
by occ1990dd;
run;
data offshoring2;
set work.offshoring;
rename occ1990dd = occ1990;
run;
data IPUMS.Good;
merge IPUMS.dum exp.ai work.offshoring2;
by occ1990;
run;
data IPUMS.intermediate;
set IPUMS.Good;
run;
proc sort nodupkey;
by indocc;
run;
data indoccpct2010;
/*creating employment variable for 2010*/
merge IPUMS.Good;
by OCC1990;
if pct_software = . then delete;
if year = 2010 then _2010 = 1;
else delete;
run;
proc freq;
tables indocc*(_2010) / out=want outpct;
run;
data TwentyTen;
set work.want;
Rename PCT_COL = Pct2010;
run;
data occpct1980;
merge IPUMS.dum exp.ai;
/*creating employment variable for 1980*/
by OCC1990;
if pct_software = . then delete;
if year = 1980 then _1980 = 1;
else delete;
run;
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proc freq;
tables indocc*(_1980) / out=please outpct;
run;
data NineteenEighty;
set work.please;
Rename PCT_COL = Pct1980;
run;
data pctmerge;
merge work.TwentyTen work.NineteenEighty;
by indocc;/*creating main independent variable (change in employment)*/
if Pct2010 = . then delete;
if Pct1980 = . then delete;
PctChange= Pct2010 - Pct1980;
DHSPctChange = (Pct2010-Pct1980)/((Pct2010+Pct1980)/2);
PctChangeOCC= (Pct2010 - PctChange) / Pct2010;
run;
data IPUMS.control;
set IPUMS.Good;
if year = 2010 then _2010=1;
else delete;
run;
proc sort;
by indocc;
run;
proc means noprint;
by indocc;
var Female age White African_American Other_Race Less_than_HS
Diploma_or_GED Some_College Bachelors Masters_Plus LogIncome
Low_education Medium_Education High_Education;
output out = control mean(Female age White African_American Other_Race
Less_Than_HS Diploma_or_GED Some_College Bachelors Masters_plus
LogIncome Low_education Medium_Education High_Education)=
Avg_Female Avg_age Avg_White Avg_African_American
Avg_Other_Race Avg_Less_than_HS Avg_Diploma_or_GED
Avg_Some_College Avg_Bachelors Avg_Masters_Plus Avg_LogIncome
Avg_Low_education Avg_Medium_Education Avg_High_Education;
run;
data IPUMS.FINAL;
merge work.control work.pctmerge IPUMS.Intermediate;
by indocc;
if ind1990 = . then delete;
if occ1990 = . then delete;
if pct_software = . then delete;
if DHSpctchange = . then delete;
if task_offshorability = . then delete;
if female = . then delete;
if African_American = . then delete;
if Other_Race = . then delete;
if Age = . then delete;
if Medium_Education = . then delete;
if High_Education = . then delete;
if LogIncome = . then delete;
DHS= DHSpctchange*(100);
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run;
proc contents;
run;
ods pdf;
proc reg;
model DHS = pct_software;
run;
proc reg;
model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Female
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age
Avg_Medium_Education Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome;
run;
proc reg;
model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Medium_Education
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome;
run;
proc sort;
by ind1990 occ1990;
run;
proc panel data = IPUMS.Final;
title "Fixed Effects Model 1";
id ind1990 occ1990;
model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Medium_Education
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome / FIXONE;
run;
proc panel data = IPUMS.Final;
title "Fixed Effects Model 2";
id ind1990 occ1990;
model DHS = pct_software task_offshorability Avg_Female
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age Avg_Medium_Education
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome / FIXONE;
run;
ods pdf close;
proc means data = IPUMS.Final;
run;
proc corr data = IPUMS.Final;
var DHS pct_software pct_ai task_offshorability Avg_Female
Avg_African_American Avg_Other_Race Avg_age Avg_Medium_Education
Avg_High_Education Avg_LogIncome;
with DHS pct_software pct_ai task_offshorability;
run;

